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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECT SATELLITE
BROADCASTING-THE U.N. WORKING GROUP
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past twenty years the world community has been confronted
with the greatest technological revolution in history. The Space Age, while
revolutionizing communications and transportation, has also created legal
problems concerning control of these new developments. These problems
have proved to be a unique challenge to the settled system of international
decisionmaking. Not long ago, Mr. [Adlail Stevenson noted that "the
conquest of outer space posed new legal, political, technical, and other
problems which would not always be capable of solution by the methods
employed in human relations on Earth. . . .'" To deal with these prob-
lems, the world community must acknowledge the interdependence of the
legal and technical aspects in the field,2 which imposes an obligation on
the scientific community to keep the legal profession informed as to the
latest developments in space technology.'
The first major international attempt to resolve these problems has re-
sulted in the United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies,4 which deals with the most obvious and imme-
diate issues. This Treaty has espoused certain general philosophical princi-
ples such as freedom of use' and nonacquisition of territory in space.6
However, outside of formulating general policy concerning activities
wholly or predominantly carried on in outer space, the Treaty failed to
consider outer space activities whose direct effects are essentially earth-
bound. Such activities include remote earth sensing, weather modification
and direct broadcasting. These have wide political implications and have
caused growing concern among many nations, especially in the case of
direct broadcasting. This Note will present a survey of the legal problems
created by direct broadcasting and indicate potential conflict areas.
II. DIRECT BROADCASTING AND WORLD REACTION
Direct broadcasting has been defined simply as the "transmission of
E.B. JONES, EARTH SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 50
(1970) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
I Address by Eilene Galloway, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space, International Institute of Space Law of the International Astronautical Federa-
tion, Sept. 30 to Oct. 5, 1974, 30 [hereinafter cited as Galloway].
I Id. at 30. Ms. Galloway quotes her own paper from the 1st Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space, emphasizing that the initial difficulties perceived by the Colloquium have
persisted without solution.
I Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for
United States Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
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messages directly to the houses or communities of the general public via
artificial space satellites."7 There are basically two types of direct broad-
casting: (1) reception of the transmissions into community receivers for
rebroadcast, and (2) direct reception by private sets without the aid of a
community transmitter. Technology in this field8 has advanced to the
point that transmission into a community receiver is becoming much more
frequent. This type of direct broadcasting evokes little controversy since a
community receiver is needed for retransmission, thereby giving the receiv-
ing state ultimate control over what is broadcast.
The legal controversy arises from broadcasting into augmented or
unaugmented home receivers without the use of a community receiver.
While this type of transmission may not be technically or economically
feasible until 1985, concern over its potentials has been vocalized by some
nations9 and has elicited response from the United Nations. The topic of
direct broadcast satellites has been included on the agenda of the Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.'" In 1968 the Committee estab-
lished, to work as its subcommittee, a Working Group on direct broadcast
satellites." The aim of the Working Group is:
[T]o study and report on the technical feasibility of communication by
direct broadcast from satellites and the current and foreseeable develop-
ment in this field, including comparative user costs and other economic
considerations, as well as the implications of such developments in the
social, cultural, legal and other areas .... '1
The first controversy arose in the interpretation and determination of
the actual goal of the Working Group. In November 1972, the Soviet Union
introduced a resolution which was passed by the General Assembly, declar-
ing that any formulation of general principles or regulations in the field of
direct broadcasting should be enunciated in a formal convention.'3 The
vote was 102 in favor of the resolution, with the only opposing vote being
cast by the United States. Its opposition stems from the idea that a specific
policy should not be formulated in an undeveloped area where there has
been little international experience or experimentation:' 4
The United States favors a functional and pluralistic approach in which
the development of legal principles would take place in a rather prag-
Gotlieb & Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting: A Case Study in the Development of the
Law of Space Communications, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 33 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gotlieb
& Dalfen].
For a relatively simple explanation of the technical basics of satellite transmission see
A.G. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 159-232 (1963).
Galloway, supra note 2, at 35.
, Id. at 33-34.
G.A. Res. 2453, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
"Id.
SG.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30 at 14, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
" The concern is that future technological development might be inhibited and that there
might be an adverse effect on the free exchange of ideas. Galloway, supra note 2, at 35.
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matic, step-by-step process from a variety of complementary sources, as
opposed to proceeding on an essentially abstract formulation of a single
over-arching body of international law principles institutionalized in one
paramount international agency. 5
Realistically, the United States position of flexibility would appear to
be the more workable solution in this case. Considering the speed of ad-
vancement in this area, any specific policy formulation would be outdated
before it could be put into effect. Such a situation would call for constant
and troublesome revision and would create situations for greater abuse.
The United States position would allow the drafting of voluntary principles
on which there is general agreement, 6 while at the same time allowing the
legal aspects of the field to evolve with the technical advancement.
III. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF PROGRAM CONTENT
The main problem in defining and resolving legal issues created by di-
rect broadcasting stems from the technical nature of satellite transmission.
The biggest advantage of direct broadcasting is that a single transmission
will be capable of covering a large geographical area. A particular viewing
public may include populations of different political, cultural, ideological,
and economic outlooks 7 which will have to be reconciled in any program
planning by broadcasters. Whether or not the broadcasters' program plan-
ning should be regulated by international guidelines concerning program
content is the basic legal question facing the Working Group. Attempting
to reconcile the major interests may prove to be an impossible task and
may result in nothing more than a vague declaration of general philosophi-
cal principles which would have little or no practical effect.
A. Free Flow of Information and National Sovereignty
The greatest point of debate within the Working Group has been the
conflict between the advocates of the free flow of information and those
who advocate supremacy of national sovereignty. Views expressed range
from that of the United States, which claims that the freedom of use
guaranteed by the Outer Space Treaty" includes the right to broadcast
world wide by satellite, to the view expressed by the Soviet Union to the
effect that national sovereignty of the receiving country should control
what is broadcast to its populace.
Unfortunately, the issue has been used by the Soviet Union as a "back-
" Rockwood, Direct Satellite Broadcasting, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 601, 602 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Rockwood].
S Galloway, supra note 2, at 35.
" See Errera, Problems Raised by the Content of Television Programs Transmitted by
Telecommunication Satellites, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 85, 88 (E.
McWhinney ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Errera].
"1 Supra note 4.
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door" reintroduction of the post war propaganda debate." At the fifth
session of the Working Group, 0 the Soviet delegation introduced its most
recent draft proposals" in which they attempted to define a program stan-
dard:
States undertake to exclude from television programmes transmitted by
means of artificial earth satellites any material which is detrimental to the
maintenance of international peace and security which publicizes ideas of
war, militarism, national racial hatred and enmity between peoples which
is aimed at interfering in the internal domestic affairs of other States, or
which undermines the foundations of local civilization, culture, way of
life, traditions or language."2
The Soviet Union feels that this standard should be determined by the
receiving country as an exercise of its right of national sovereignty.
The first section of the Soviet proposal gives the traditional definition
of political propaganda which was given in the 1947 General Assembly
Propaganda Resolution 3 and mentioned in the Preamble of the Outer
Space Treaty.24 This section will cause little dispute and all parties will
probably give it at least tacit approval.
Potential problems arise in the second part of the provision where a type
of "cultural propaganda" is defined. This section appeals especially to the
Third World countries, who are more concerned with the cultural impact
than with the political impact of foreign broadcasting." As the Argentine
Draft Proposals states: "Cultural programmes must respect the distinctive
character, value and dignity of every culture, and the right of all States
and peoples to preserve their culture as an element of the common heritage
of mankind."2 The fear of the emerging countries that their culture will
be slowly eroded is not totally unfounded. Since the United States and the
Soviet Union are presently the only countries financially and technically
"1 Rockwood, supra note 15, at 604; see The Legal Problems of International Telecommuni-
cations with Special Reference to INTELSAT, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 287, 308 (1970) (remarks
by Prof. E. W. McWhinney).
Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites on the Work of its Fifth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Working Group].
1I Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television
Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/W6.3(v)/CRP.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Soviet
Draft].
n Id. art. IV. (emphasis added).
1 1947 Anti-Propaganda Resolution, G.A. Res. 110, 2 U.N. GAOR Resolutions at 14, U.N.
Doc. A/519 (1947). This states that "The General Assembly 1. Condemns all forms of propa-
ganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or
encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of agression ....
24 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, preamble.
Friendly (moderator), The Control of Program Content in International Telecommuni-
cations: A Discussion of General Principles, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 40, 63 (1974) (State-
ment by panelist F. Shakespeare) [hereinafter cited as Shakespeare].
2 Argentine Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3(V)/CRP.3 (1974), art. 18 [hereinafter
cited as Argentine Draft].
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capable of satellite broadcasting,27 the African and Latin American states
are fearful that certain programming would undermine their culture,
which in many instances is the only unifying factor in an emerging nation.
While one can sympathize with the position taken by the Third World
countries, the vague language in the Soviet proposal could easily be taken
to ridiculous extremes and perhaps result in absolute censorship. As intro-
duced and interpreted, the proposal would all but eliminate any possibility
of commercial broadcasting. Advertising and programming are themselves
a subtle form of propaganda, because commercial broadcasting by its
very nature is biased, reflecting the opinions and purposes of the creator.
Taking the definition of "cultural propaganda" to its logical extreme, such
advertising could be attacked as undermining a way of life.
Even if commercial broadcasting was not undertaken and transmissions
were limited to educational or cultural events, similar problems would
arise. Since truth is not mentioned as a defense to propaganda,29 even
newscasts and documentaries would have to be strictly censored to prevent
the risk of having the program come under attack. The availability of a
workable standard is limited because "[t]ruth accepted by one nation's
interpretation may well be regarded as propaganda by other nations. 2 30
Even publicity of a play, film, or musical performance can contain subtle
propaganda.3 ' The possibility of abuse of the censorship authority is so
evident that it can destroy any potential that direct broadcasting may
have.
Impliedly, the United States policy on this issue has been to advocate
the predominance of the free flow of information: "if states do not realize
that a limit to national sovereignty is for the good of individuals, the
danger exists of seeing a new instrument-with all its potential for in-
creased freedom-contributing paradoxically to a new restriction on the
free circulation of ideas and information."32 The United States view can
be supported by article I of the Outer Space Treaty which insures freedom
of use.3 However, "the freedom of broadcasting is a freedom to transmit
to receiving countries, and also a concomitant freedom of the latter coun-
tries to stop it.""4 Freedom of use is not an absolute right and restraints
' While the U.S.S.R. and the United States are the only individual countries capable of
direct broadcasting, there are private international broadcasting agencies. Due to the agen-
cies' international character, the cultural problems discussed would be minimized.
2' See Errera, supra note 17, at 91.
' JONES, supra note 1, at 73.
3 Id. See also E. BARRETr, TRUTH IS OUR WEAPON 65 (1953); P. Davison, The Role of
Research in Political Warfare, 29 JOURNALISM Q. 22 (1953).
3' Errera, supra note 17, at 88.
32 d'Arcy, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of Information, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 149 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as d'Arcyl.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I.
Friendly (moderator), The Control of Program Content in International Telecommuni-
cations: A Discussion of General Principles, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 40, 56 (1974) (state-
ment by panelist A. Chayes).
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may be placed on a broadcaster by collective action in the name of greater
freedom for all.35
The United States also points to article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.' '36 While this
is a strong argument in support of the United States position, there is a
drawback in the fact that the United States has failed to ratify the Decla-
ration. Though opposition is not on this particular point, the fact that the
treaty is not binding on the United States will lend little support to its
position.
While it may appear that the United States policy is the ideal solution,
there is a philosophical flaw in the argument. America's idea of the basic
freedoms (speech, press, etc.) has a unique application in this country. The
almost absolute protection of these rights is considered anarchistic by most
of the world community. While the United States may have good inten-
tions in the promotion of this policy, it would result in an imposition of a
global First Amendment. Such an attempt "would be doomed to failure
and would be widely misread as an attempt to reach foreign audiences for
the financial profit and political advantage of this country. ' '3
It is evident that before any headway can be made in solving this dis-
pute, guidelines must be formulated to define both national sovereignty
and its relationship to free flow of information and the freedom of use;
perhaps then the two ideas may be reconciled. The Argentine Draft states
that "[tihe principle of freedom of information and free flow of communi-
cations is not incompatible with the adoption of additional principles de-
signed to harmonize the rights of states and to protect the economic, social
and cultural values of their peoples." The spirit of cooperation and disci-
pline with respect for national sovereignty that has marked space explora-
tion up to this point should and could be extended to the direct broadcast
field .39
B. Prior Consent
A similar problem was presented by the introduction of the Soviet policy
of prior consent, which states that "states may carry out direct television
Johnson, The Emerging Customary Law of Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONs 34, 44 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Johnson]. An effort is made to explain the possible controls that can be utilized within the
limits of present international law to discourage any attempted absolute use of outer space
activity.
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19 (1948)
(emphasis added).
" Chayes & Chazen, Policy Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites, 5 STAN. J.
INT'L STUD. 4, 13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Chayes & Chazen].
Argentine Draft, supra note 26, art. 13.
' d'Arcy, supra note 32, at 153.
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broadcasting by means of artificial satellites to foreign States only with the
express consent of the latter."4 The Canadian-Swedish proposal," intro-
duced at the fifth session, went even further. It called not only for prior
consent, but also for participation in programming.42 Similarly, the Argen-
tine Draft states that "[c]onsent implies participation in scheduled activ-
ities." 3
The vague definition of prior consent in the Soviet Draft offers no sugges-
tion as to the type of consent that would be required. Some countries claim
that the consent must be active; the broadcasting country is required to
actively seek and receive positive consent from the recipient state." The
Argentine Draft, for example, states that "tacit or extemporaneous consent
is not acceptable. . .. -'" Other countries feel that it is up to the recipient
state to affirmatively refuse the broadcast. 6 The severest type of prior
consent that could be required would be to demand that the broadcaster
receive consent before the launching of an operational satellite system. 7
There is also a problem in determining the extent of a consent that is to
be given, whether it is to be a blanket permission to last an indefinite time
or a permission that is to be renewed with each broadcast. 8 However, that
consent for every broadcast would be unreasonable and would cause undue
governmental interference.'"
The debate over prior consent could cause domestic problems in the
United States. Any international argreement attempting to formalize the
doctrine will necessarily entail some foreign and domestic governmental
control over programming. It will be difficult to reconcile America's
perhaps oversimplistic ideal of freedom of speech 0 with such control. The
problem is further complicated by the fact that most of the satellite broad-
casting originating from the United States will be from privately owned
broadcasting agencies. The possibility of control over a free enterprise will
meet with some public denunciation, if not with some legal problems.
Since the Working Group is of the opinion that States should bear interna-
tional responsibility for activities in this field, 51 an illegal program trans-
" Soviet Draft, supra note 21, art. V.
" Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
105/WG.3/L4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Draft].
,2 Id. art. V.
Argentine Draft, supra note 26, art. 14. Article 15 of the Argentine Draft enumerates
procedures and the extent of required participation. See id. art. 15.
" Gotlieb & Dalfen, supra note 7, at 54.
".Argentine Draft, supra note 26, art. 14.
,1 Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites on the Work in its Second
Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.106/66 (1971).
"7 See Galloway, supra note 2, at 37.
" d'Arcy, supra note 32, at 167.
49 Id.
Rockwood, supra note 15, at 603.
Working Group, supra note 20, at 16. The Group uses Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty as a basis of this responsibility.
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mission would necessarily have to result in the direct intervention by the
United States government into the affairs of the broadcasting agency.
Another difficulty arises in the lack of practicality in the application of
the prior consent proposal, considering the transmitting range of modern
satellites. By 1985, a single satellite will be able to cover over one-fourth
of the globe. If broadcasters were required to receive consent from every
receiving country, one state's veto could block out the transmission for the
consenting states. Using the rationale behind the Soviet Union's argument
of governmental control over programming, this could be construed as an
infringement on the national sovereignty of the consenting states.52
The possibilities of abuse are almost endless. The United States repre-
sentative to the Working Group suggested that the Group should examine
the effects of an arbitrary withdrawal of consent53 or a situation in which
consent for broadcasting is easily coerced by diplomatic threats. Parties
would be forced to comply or face the possibility of having an entire satel-
lite system rendered useless. In an area which uniquely affects the popu-
lace more than the state itself, a concerted effort should be made to keep
the field as free of political disputes as possible.
It would appear that the only way to make the concept of prior consent
practical and workable to any extent would be to formulate regional rather
than global broadcasting systems. Such systems would group countries of
similar culture, religion, and political ideologies and adapt the program-
ming accordingly. Even this solution has its practical limitations. While
satellite broadcasting is relatively accurate, it is not capable of pinpoint
transmission and some of the broadcasts necessarily will cross regional
boundaries.
C. Spillover and the Right to Consult
As mentioned in the previous section, in any satellite transmission cov-
ering a large geographical area there are bound to be spillover signals into
other areas. While some of this spillover will be eliminated as satellite
technology advances, some spillover will be unavoidable. The Working
Group stated that "[iut was therefore necessary to elaborate criteria on a
universally accepted basis to define what was and what was not unavoida-
ble spillover in order to avoid possible problems of interpretation on this
point." 54
The main concern is that countries will use the idea of unavoidable
spillover as an excuse for intentional broadcasting of propaganda. In order
to alleviate this problem, the Soviet,55 Canadian," and Argentine 57 drafts
"2 d'Arcy, supra note 32, at 165.
Galloway, supra note 2, at 36.
Working Group, supra note 20, at 16.
Soviet Draft, supra note 21, art. VIII.
Canadian Draft, supra note 41, art. VII.
"7 Argentine Draft, supra note 26, art. 14.
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propose that if the broadcaster knows that spillover is inevitable, he must
immediately enter into consultations with the countries receiving the spil-
lover transmission. There is no suggestion, however, as to what the duty
to consult actually is, what form it should take, or what the results should
be. One can assume that the duty to consult would result in a type of
modified prior consent rule. This would create the possibility that a failure
to receive consent to the spillover could blackout an entire system. How-
ever, the Argentine draft states that even though prior acceptance is
needed, there is no obligation for participation in programming by the
State receiving the spillover. 51
The only benefit that may arise in consultations is that the process may
force the broadcaster into using more effective procedures to limit the
unavoidable spillover. In cases of unavoidable spillover, it would be hard
to imagine that the world community would forbid a broadcaster to trans-
mit if it had failed to receive consent from the receiving country.
IV. SOURCES OF CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT
Once the legal problems posed by direct broadcasting are discovered and
defined, serious problems will remain for resolution. The parties must
agree to be regulated and to subject themselves to some enforcement proce-
dure. Determining the sources of control and enforcement will be a major
problem for the Working Group. In a case study by Gotlieb and Dalfen,
the authors pointed out the unique situation created by the common use
of outer space.
[T]he case study rejected any notion of automaticity in the application
of international law to the new realms, such as outer space, which have
been opened for human activity through technological advances. Rather,
it depicted a process of conscious selection by states of appropriate rules
and analogies. This selection it described as an interweaving process of
building on existing norms of international law and of drawing principles
and analogies from related fields in both international and domestic law.59
Therefore, this last section will deal with the more practical and avail-
able sources of law and also with alternatives for enforcement procedures.
A. Applicable Sources of Present Internatiomal Law
"[Tihere is a growing awareness that the existing international legal
order embraces outer space and all of man's activities there.""0 Existing
law, however, will probably serve only as a general foundation which will
have to be adapted and assimilated.
'Id.
C. M. Dalfen, The International Legislative Process: Direct Broadcasting and Remote
Earth Sensing by Satellite Compared, 10 CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 186, 188 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Dalfen].
Johnson, supra note 35, at 34.
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Most members of the Working Group agree that the Outer Space
Treaty" is directly relevant to direct broadcasting. 2 However, "[tihe ar-
gument was advanced that the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space did not cover
earth resources and direct broadcast satellites because these particular
space applications were not known at the time the Treaty was being
drafted."6 3 This argument is hardly tenable considering the Committee's
knowledge of outer space potential and the general language of the Treaty
which could be interpreted as applicable to any outer space activity. At
the same time, it is the general language which may render the Treaty
almost useless. The directly relevant articles are more philosophical ideas
than black-letter rules: (1) international cooperation in development and
exploration," (2) freedom of use,6 5 and (3) sovereign equality.66 It is almost
impossible to apply abstract ideas, especially when there is no agreement
as to their meaning. One of the hottest debates in the Working Group is
the attempt to reconcile the ideas of "freedom of use" and "sovereign
equality":
Perhaps the most optimistic view of the Treaty is that it is a hesitant
attempt toward the acknowledgment that some legal authority is requisite
in outer space. Therefore the Treaty may be considered as a guideline
which enumerates some of the difficulties which may be encountered in
outer space exploration and activities. "7
The value of the Treaty would be to serve as a foundation which could be
implemented in a more detailed manner by subsequent international
agreements."6
Whatever application that the U.N. Charter has, it suffers from the
same weakness as the Outer Space Treaty. Most of the relevant articles
are of the same high sounding generalities to which all nations at least give
lip service. However, there may be one area where the Charter may have
a strong and important role. Chapter VI sets out procedures for the pacific
settlement of disputes." If the parties bring themselves under the auspices
of the U.N., it could become a viable source of mediation for any dispute
that may arise from inadmissable broadcasts.
There have been some conventions passed and proposed that are out-
growths of the Outer Space Treaty, and they may have some applicability
" Supra note 4.
" Working Group, supra note 20, at 10.
" Galloway, supra note 2, at 32.
" Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, preamble, art. I.
" Id. art. I.
I d.
' JONES, supra note 1, at 85.
" See Gotlieb & Dalfen, supra note 7, at 56, 60 for a tracing of the evolution of norms for
area satellite broadcasting up to the present. Agreements subsequent to the Treaty could fall
in the same pattern.
11 U.N. CHARTER, Art. VI.
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to direct broadcasting. The 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects70 reinforces the state responsibility
doctrine of the Outer Space Treaty.7 There is also before the United Na-
tions Outer Space Committee a Draft Convention on Registration of Ob-
jects Launched in Outer Space72 which would include notifying the
Secretary-General of any object launched into space.
There is also general agreement that the rules and regulations of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) should be controlling
wherever applicable.7 3 The ITU is a U.N. organization whose main purpose
is to allocate broadcasting frequencies on an international level and to
assign specific orbits for satellites. "There was disagreement on the extent
to which . . . [these regulations would] apply, the difference being be-
tween those who consider that these regulations are only for technical
purposes and those who hold that they provide a comprehensive framework
beyond technical aspects. 7 4
The delegates of the Working Group have suggested other conventions
or resolutions that they feel should carry some weight in any formulation
of policy and regulation in the direct broadcasting field.75 These include:
(1) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States," (2) the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,77 and (3) the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights."
Whatever role these existing sources will play in the formulation of direct
broadcasting policy, it is evident that they will have to be supplemented
and adapted. How effective they become will depend on whether the par-
ties can agree on some basic compromises concerning the language of the
sources and their corresponding weight.
B. Illegality of Broadcasts, Government Reponsibility, and the
Settlement of Disputes
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states that "[s]tates Parties to the
Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space . . . whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities . . . ,,79 Since the Working
Group has conceded the applicability of the Outer Space Treaty to direct
7" G.A. Res. 27777, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VI.
72 Galloway, supra note 2, at 31.
71 Working Group, supra note 20, at 10.
7, Galloway, supra note 2, at 37.
71 Working Group, supra note 20, at 10-11.
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
77 Supra note 36.
7' G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VI.
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broadcasting, it would appear that any policy formulation in the area
would demand that there be governmental responsibility for every trans-
mission, whether it be from a public or private broadcaster. While there is
general agreement that there should be governmental responsibility for
transmissions, there is a divergence of opinion as to the status of the
responsibility or liability.
One view, represented mainly by the USSR 0 and implicitly supported
by Argentina,"' is that unwanted broadcasts should be declared illegal and
handled accordingly. The United States, on the other hand, adheres to the
view that such activities should not be labelled as illegal:
The view was expressed that the concept of illegality of broadcasts should
not form the basis for formulating a provision for governing direct televi-
sion broadcasting by satellites. While certain types of television broadcast
by satellite emanating from another country might be considered inadmis-
sible, it would be inappropriate to introduce the concept of illegality of
broadcasts. The view was expressed that the introduction of the concept
of illegality without objective criteria, which are extremely difficult to
agree upon, would rather give rise to international conflicts."2
On its face it appears that this battle is one of semantics rather than
principle. However, this "word game" will have an effect on the formula-
tion of dispute settlement machinery. Article IX of the Soviet Draft states:
1. In case of transmission to any state of broadcasts which are illegal in
the meaning of article VI, that state may take in respect to such broad-
casts measures which are recognized as legal under international law.
2. States agree to give every assistance in stopping illegal television
broadcasting."
While the emphasis of the Working Group has been on the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes,' the wording of the Soviet Draft opens for speculation
the possibility of other methods being used. Under the U.N. Charter these
could include: embargoes,"5 collective action," and perhaps even force."'
From a purely psychological point of view, it would be easier to rationalize
the more drastic measures if the activities were labelled illegal. On the
Soviet Draft, supra note 21, art. IX.
The Argentine Draft never specifically states the status of inadmissible broadcasts, but
in one article of its proposal it states the idea of illegality implicitly. "The freedom enshrined
in the 1967 treaty on Outer Space is not an unlimited freedom but is subject to international
cooperation which determines the legality or illegality of any activity .... Argentine Draft,
supra note 26, art. 14.
"2 Working Group, supra note 20, at 18.
1 Soviet Draft, supra note 21, art. IX (emphasis added).
Working Group, supra note 20, at 19.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
8*Id.
Id. art. 42. Force should be used only if the Security Council considers such drastic
measures necessary.
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other hand, if the United States suggestion was followed and the unwanted
broadcasts were labelled merely inadmissible, it would be hard to condone
any other action than the recognized peaceful settlement.
Taking the second part of the Soviet Draft article to its logical extreme,
it is foreseeable that it could be used as a backdoor entrance to political
intervention in the name of collective security. The idea of illegality would
go far in condoning such intervention to the world community. Therefore
it would seem the safer course to eliminate the concept of illegality in such
matters.
C. Jamming Systems and Receiving Country Censorship
One of the most practical sources of control over unwanted broadcasts
would be the control of transmissions by the receiving country. If an effec-
tive and workable control can be found, it could eliminate many of the
potential international problems that could arise if the control would have
to come from the source of the broadcast.
As long as direct broadcasts have to be transmitted through ground
receivers, the receiving country will have ultimate control over the program
content. The problem arises when satellites will be able to broadcast di-
rectly into home receivers. For the first few years, this type of transmission
into home receivers will have to be augmented with a simple, relatively
inexpensive antenna. At this stage, the government could exercise control
by forbidding the sale of the apparatus.' However, the device would be so
simple it could be handmade. As the technology of direct broadcasting
becomes more advanced, the receiving country will be able to exert less
control.
The receiving country, however, will always have the ultimate control
over any transmission. Jamming systems can be set up whereby the receiv-
ing country can block the incoming signals of the transmitter. Even though
this is the most effective means of control, there are two major disadvan-
tages that may prevent it from becoming workable over any large area.
First is the expense involved. Despite the fact that the costs for a jamming
system are far lower than a transmitting system, 9 the expense of a jam-
ming system will keep it out of reach of many of the developing countries.
The second problem is both technical and legal. Jamming signals, like
transmitting signals, are sporadic and not easily controlled. The state that
has the jamming system must use the signals only within their sovereign
airspace. There will be a definite problem of spillover into countries that
want to receive the broadcasts. The same problem of national sovereignty
will arise, and the entire controversy over program content will still have
to be confronted.
Whether the expense and the possibility of political confrontation is
0 Dalfen, supra note 59, at 193.
K9 Id.
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worth the advantages gained by the use of a jamming system is a dilemma
that will have to be faced by each state. An effective and inexpensive
system of receiving country censorship will be strongly supported by the
United States. This will also eliminate most of the constitutional problems
created by the prior consent and national sovereignty debates.
D. Possible International Control and Enforcement Organizations
After a policy is formulated for direct broadcasting, the next problem
that arises is the establishment of an enforcement organization capable of
handling the unique and sensitive problems that will be created. Whether
a new organization is created or an established organization is adapted, it
will have to deal with a highly technical field with unprecedented and far-
reaching political and legal implications.
The most logical choice for an enforcement organization would, of
course, be the U.N. However, there has been some apprehension expressed
about having the U.N., as a whole, take control. One criticism is that the
U.N. may not be able to balance conflicting national interests without
domination by one state.90 There is also the feeling that the General Assem-
bly will probably act as a posteriori (after the fact), rather than as a priori
(before the fact) as it has done in other areas of outer space policy.9' States
themselves will have to innovate prudently until the General Assembly
formulates a policy. If the U.N. is to become a viable and effective force
in this area, it will have to take the position of leader rather than follower.
Another criticism was voiced by the United States. The United States
is one of only two countries able to afford a direct broadcasting system and
would not want to leave its regulation in the hands of an organization with
its present voting procedures - one state/one vote.9" An alternative to this
would be to have a weighted voting procedure depending on the amount
of contribution to the U.N.
A unique solution has been proposed, whereby the U.N. itself would
become the only worldwide broadcaster. The system would be entirely
financed and controlled by a special U.N. committee. Time would be
allocated to each country, during which there would be almost complete
freedom of transmission.93 While this may appear to be the ideal solution,
it would probably not receive approval by the countries who support the
prior consent policy. Considering its basically political nature, it seems
that the most practical role the U.N. could play would be through the
establishment of a separate organization under its auspices to settle dis-
putes in this area.9"
" See d'Arcy, supra note 32, at 163.
" Id. at 156.
9 Rockwood, supra note 15, at 603.
, Shakespeare, supra note 25, at 64.
" Chayes & Chazen, supra note 37, at 18.
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The ITU has also been suggested as a possible enforcement body. How-
ever, there has been a considerable amount of criticism of this suggestion.
An initial criticism is the complaint that the ITU is a technical body and
that in its present state it is not capable of handling the sensitive political
and legal problems which will undoubtedly arise. Another major criticism
is that ". . . if the ITU is made responsible for direct broadcasting, it will
be required to undertake far more aggressive regulation than it has in the
past. Whether the organization can be adapted to such new demands is
uncertain, given its long tradition of passivity."9" Another failing of the
ITU is that the U.S.S.R. is not a member, but it can be assumed that if
there is enough pressure to make the ITU the controlling organization, the
U.S.S.R. will probably begin to participate. The major advantage of this
organization is the reputation that it has of being apolitical, furnishing the
necessary stimulus to compromise.
INTELSAT (International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium"
a U.N. organization formed in 1967, has also been suggested for a regula-
tory body. The goal of INTELSAT is to establish a single global satellite
system working in conformity with principles of space law and interna-
tional communications. 7 However, up to the present time, its policy has
seemed to have been shaped by the United States as the prime user of
satellite space. This has been because the U.S.S.R., until recently, has not
played an active role. In the past few years the U.S.S.R. has begun to fully
participate because of the development of detente and technical advance-
ments in the field.9 "The main contemporary criticism of INTELSAT...
do not concern technical performance but an alleged lack of genuinely
international character, due to the substantially United States-based con-
trol of its internal voting and decision-making powers and to the United
States monopoly of its managerial functions." '99 There is also the fear that
giving program content and control functions to an international organiza-
tion like INTELSAT puts it in the middle of political and ideological
battles when it should be left to technical and functional problems.1'0
However, it has the advantage of having a highly specialized staff with a
more aggressive approach than the ITU.'01 In practice, it seems to be rela-
tively nondiscriminatory as far as offering communication services, creat-
u Id. at 17.
Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communica-
tions Satellite System, G.A. Res. 1721, 17 GAOR, Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
'7 Gotlieb & Dalfen, supra note 7, at 41.
McWhinney, The Antinomy of Policy and Function in the Institutionalization of Inter-
national Telecommunications Broadcasting, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3, 10 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as McWhinney].
" McWhinney, The Development of an International Law of Communications, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 14 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
McWhinney, supra note 98, at 24.
Chayes & Chazen, supra note 37, at 18-19.
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ing opportunities for free investment, and allowing participation in design
and development to all interested parties.'10
There appears to be a practical solution to the problem of forming a
regulatory body that inexplicably has been given little attention. Many of
the legal and political problems that would be created by a global broad-
cast system could be avoided if the transmitting was done on a regional
level. If broadcasting was organized and controlled by regional agencies,
it would be considerably easier to formulate programming schedules. It is
easier to arrange a program plan for a region that has similar economies,
political leanings, and social organization. Geographically, it would be a
rather easy task to divide the globe into workable regions: North America,
Latin and South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, Africa, Near and Middle East, and the Far East. Working out the
minor differences that would occur within one of these regions would cer-
tainly be easier than trying to solve the same problems on a global level.
About the only problem that would be of the same magnitude as on the
global level would be the problem of spillover, which was previously dis-
cussed. Even if the regional device was used only temporarily, it could be
an important initial step in achieving global broadcasting by formulating
policies of compromise in the different regions.
V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the introduction to this Note, direct broadcasting is
creating unique problems for the world community. At the same time it is
offering the world community a unique opportunity to create extensive
compromises that could have a beneficial effect on policy-making in other
fields. Whether the world community will retain the cooperative spirit that
it has shown in other areas of space policy is a question that can only be
answered in the future.
Nancy M. Lesko
02 JONES, supra note 1, at 115.
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